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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing controversy as to the impact of private equity acquisitions, especially in terms of their 
impact on employment and subsequent organizational performance.  It has been suggested that closer 
owner supervision and the injection of a new management team revitalize the acquired organization and 
unlock dormant capabilities and value.  However, both politicians and trade unionists suggest that private 
equity acquirers may significantly reallocate value away from employees to short term investors, typically 
through layoffs and reduced wages, which may undermine future organizational sustainability.  This 
article investigates this in the context of a sample of institutional buy outs (IBOs) undertaken in the UK 
between 1997 and 2006.  Specifically we examine the impact of IBOs on both employment and 
remuneration against two control groups of non-acquired firms.  In designing our study we follow the 
empirical approach taken by Conyon et al (2001 and 2002) in investigating the employment consequences 
of regular takeovers.  Our main finding is a significant loss in employment in firms subject to an IBO in 
the year immediately following the acquisition as well as lower wage rates, when compared to either of 
the two control groups.  Furthermore, we find no evidence of a subsequent improvement either in 
productivity or profitability in the acquired businesses.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This article investigates the consequences of private equity takeovers on employment and remuneration, 
focusing specifically on institutional buy outs (IBOs). There is a growing public policy interest in the role 
of private equity investors. Central to this debate is a concern that private equity may represent an 
extreme form of capitalism, seeking to maximise short term shareholder wealth while paying little 
attention to the interests of broader stakeholder groups or organizational sustainability. Indeed, both 
politicians and trade union representatives have raised serious concerns regarding the potential 
consequences of private equity acquisitions for the welfare of employees in acquired firms, calling for 
stronger regulation and greater transparency in respect of the activities of private equity acquirers (Barber, 
2007; Treasury Select Committee, 2007). Central to this is the concern that private equity acquirers may 
seek to gain at employees’ expense, specifically in terms of layoffs and lower wages, which not only 
leaves them worse off, but may also undermine the future viability of the firm (International Trade Union 
Confederation, 2007).  In contrast, proponents of the industry suggest that closer owner supervision may 
reduce the agency problem, with the injection of new managers and managerial approaches more closely 
aligned to the agenda of shareholder value maximization, optimising organizational outcomes (BVCA, 
2006). 
Running parallel to concerns in the policy community, an emerging strand of academic enquiry has begun 
to examine the employment consequences of private equity takeovers, largely motivated by the seminal 
work of Shleifer and Summers (1988), who suggested that acquisitions may provide an opportunity for 
managers to challenge any implicit contracts between employees and the firm, thereby expropriating the 
former.  However, in the context of private equity, much of this work has suffered from a lack of 
precision as to what exactly constitutes a private equity takeover. This is especially important since the 
consequences for employees are expected to depend on the type of private equity takeover in question. 
Private equity is a term frequently used to refer to two substantially different types of corporate 
investment (Wood and Wright, 2010). The first type is venture capital, which consists of early stage 
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investment in firms that have not yet been floated on the stock market. This type of investment is 
typically combined with significant input by the venture capitalist in the firm’s strategic direction. The 
broad consensus is that the effects of venture capital are typically positive (Wood and Wright, 2010). 
Conversely, the second type of investment, i.e. private equity itself, refers to the purchase by an investor, 
or the facilitation of the purchase, of a firm. Once the purchase has been completed, either new 
management is put in place or at least there is a change in management style in an attempt to enhance 
returns. Many of the initial studies, as Davis et al. (2011:1) note, conflated the two. Private equity 
takeovers of mature firms can themselves be divided into several sub-categories, although, once more, 
these are often conflated in the literature (Wood and Wright, 2009). Firstly, in the case of management 
buy outs (MBOs), the existing management team buys out external shareholders, supported by private 
equity.  Secondly, in the case of management buy ins (MBIs), outside managers take over control, again 
supported by private equity (Wood and Wright, 2009). Finally, institutional buy outs (IBOs) involve 
private equity and other institutional investors; here managers do not hold any shares at all, unless this is 
part of their reward package (Renneboog et al., 2007).  
Both Davis et al. (2011) and Wright et al. (2009) correctly note that recent criticisms of private equity 
tend to focus on the later stage buy outs rather than the involvement of venture capitalists at the early 
stage of an organization’s life-cycle. However, a significant proportion of existing empirical work has 
ignored this distinction and presents results for very large numbers of private equity transactions 
dominated by management buy outs. This is problematic as it fails to recognise the heterogeneity of the 
expected employment consequences of such acquisitions and consequently presents findings that are 
unclear as to the precise impact of the most contentious element of private equity financing.  
Notwithstanding the issues discussed above, there remains much controversy over the employment 
consequences of private equity takeovers and whether they are particularly likely to leave workers worse 
off. MBIs and IBOs normally bring about a change in management. Theoretically, Jensen (2007) argues 
that IBOs provide a solution to perceived agency problems and therefore serve to re-establish the link 
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between the business and its owners, specifically the desire on the part of owners to maximise returns, 
promoting downsizing as an antidote to previous managerial empire building. Hence, there is a greater 
likelihood of breaches of implicit contracts that the incumbent management had with the workforce. 
Unlike incumbent managers, external managers are also expected to be less willing and able to cost 
intangible human assets, other than in terms of immediate salary and wage related expenses (c.f. Aoki, 
2010). Such breaches are especially likely in IBOs compared to other types of private equity acquisitions.   
In terms of empirical evidence, research on the employment consequences of MBOs suggests that the 
consequences may be beneficial, as managers may use their insider knowledge to force cooperative work 
arrangements with employees, leaving both parties better off (Wright et al., 2007). In contrast, the 
evidence surrounding MBIs and IBOs is more mixed. Amess et al. (2007) note a small decline in 
employment following an MBI.  Thornton (2007) finds that over the longer time employees of firms 
subject to MBIs face job losses and insecurity.  Looking at a combination of types of private equity (PE) 
takeover, Wright et al. (2008) fail to find significant effects; Cressy et al. (2007) find that employment 
initially drops but then increases.  Based on a panel of case studies, Froud et al. (2007) conclude that 
MBIs and IBOs reduce jobs and weaken organizational capabilities.  Both Clarke (2009) and Ernst et al. 
(2013) argue that, in the case of IBOs and MBIs, the new management team are expected to be 
incentivised to focus on immediate profits, a key source of which may be through the liquidation of 
assets, the usage of strategies such as outsourcing, and squeezing employees through cutting jobs, 
intensifying work, and forcing through less favourable conditions of employment.  Clarke (2013) finds 
that employees are generally less well off after MBIs and IBOs, with the firm being viewed by its new 
owners primarily as a vehicle for financial engineering, rather than something in its own right. In contrast, 
Wilson et al. (2012) find evidence of productivity improvements in private equity takeovers during the 
recent financial crisis, against a control group of firms that were not subject to such acquisitions. Based 
on US evidence, Davis et al. (2008) find an initial decline in jobs, but that this is not lasting.  Davis et al. 
(2011) find that the effects on employment are limited, but with some unevenness in outcomes according 
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to sector. Finally, it has been argued that IBOs typically saddle the acquired firm with significant levels of 
debt, which increases the risk in terms of exposure to interest rate movements and increases pressure to 
generate sufficient profits to meet interest commitments (Wescott, 2009), with obviously negative 
implications for employment. 
In this study we seek to avoid the lack of precision found in earlier studies by focusing exclusively on the 
employment consequences of institutional buy outs (IBOs), as these are more likely to lend themselves to 
the type of negative employment consequences politicians and trade union representatives are most 
concerned about. We investigate whether the number of employees, employee productivity, wages and 
profitability are affected over an 11-year window around the year of acquisition. In total, we investigate 
106 IBOs undertaken in the UK between 1997 and 2006. We also utilise two control samples of non-
acquired firms, the first matches each acquired firm in terms of size and industry while the second is 
matched in terms of prior profitability. Therefore, our study focuses on the types of private equity 
acquisition most likely to have negative consequences for employees and, as a result, is capable of 
providing greater empirical clarity to a highly contentious issue. The use of control samples means that 
we can more clearly distinguish between what happens according to ownership type rather than as a result 
of structural changes in specific industries or the economy at large.  
This paper builds on an earlier pilot study conducted by the authors (Goergen et al., 2011). The present 
study benefits from three major methodological improvements. First, this study includes extensive 
regression analysis whereas there was no regression analysis in the pilot study. Second, this study also 
benefits from a second matched sample of firms that were not taken over, matched against acquired firms 
in terms of pre-event profitability. Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that the usual test statistics may not be 
well specified if samples exhibiting exceptionally good or bad pre-event operating profitability are 
compared with control samples not matched by pre-event profitability. Third, the present study also 
benefits from a much larger sample size of 106 private equity takeovers (compared to only 73 takeovers) 
and a longer period of study both in absolute terms (i.e. 1997-2006 compared to 2000-2006 only) and in 
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relative terms (by tracking private equity targets over the six years before the takeover and the four years 
subsequent to it compared to only the three years preceding the takeover and the three years after it (i.e. 
year -6 to year 4 compared to year -3 to year 3)). Given these differences, the results from the current 
study are not only more robust, but also more detailed than those from the pilot study.1       
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the sample selection, the 
research methodology and introduces and justifies our variables. This is followed by our empirical 
analysis while our conclusions are presented in the final section. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of private equity takeovers in the UK for the period 1997 to 2006. We start with the 
list of IBOs obtained from Thomson One Banker. The latter defines IBOs as “highly leveraged 
transaction[s] where one or more institutional investors act together to lead or initiate a buyout deal”. In 
contrast, MBOs and MBIs are led by the incumbent management team and a new management team, 
respectively, and backed only by institutional investors. We then check whether all acquisitions are actual 
IBOs and exclude those that are not. We also include acquisitions that have been omitted by Thomson 
One Banker. These include 7 acquisitions that are classed as acquisitions made by so called strategic 
investors, which the database used to define as long-term investors in contrast to institutional investors 
that are assumed to have shorter investment horizons. Given that this distinction is debatable, we add 
these cases to our sample. We also include acquisitions by financial acquirers as Thomson One Banker’s 
definition of these acquisitions is equivalent to that of IBOs. We end up with a total of 106 acquisitions of 
                                                 
1
 In detail, we find a significant drop in employment in the acquired firms for both years 1 and 2 post-acquisition whereas in the 
pilot study we only found a significant drop for year 1; significantly lower wages in the acquired firms post-acquisition as 
compared to the two control samples whereas in the pilot study there were no such differences; significantly lower productivity 
as well as profitability before the acquisition, which persists post-acquisition when compared to the pre-event profitability 
matched firms whereas the pilot study did not find any such differences. 
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UK listed firms completed during 1997 and 2006 (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the 
sample selection process).  
In order to assess the employment effects of IBOs, we aim to collect data for all the targets for the six 
years preceding the year of the acquisition and for the four years following that year.2 Since our sample 
companies are all public companies, obtaining data on the firms prior to acquisition is typically 
straightforward. Nevertheless, in a number of cases we are unable to obtain a complete six-year panel of 
prior data since some of our target companies were acquired relatively soon after becoming listed. So, as 
can be seen from Panel B of Table 1, the further back we go before the acquisition the further the number 
of targets for which we have a complete set of prior data is reduced. In what follows, we shall refer to the 
year of the acquisition as year 0. Years preceding the acquisition year are referred to as year -1, year -2, 
etc. and years following the acquisition are referred to as year 1, year 2, etc. 
In order to study the employment effects of private equity takeovers we compare the sample with the 
target firms to two samples of matched non-acquired firms. The first sample of matched firms is obtained 
by matching each target firm with a non-acquired firm within the same industry sector, as evidenced by 
the same 3-digit SIC code, and with the closest turnover in the year of the acquisition (or the preceding 
year if the target firm does not report turnover for the acquisition year). Four of the target firms cannot be 
matched as their SIC code is not available from Datastream. For another five target firms there is no 
suitable firm with an identical 3-digit SIC code. The matched firm also has to survive for at least two 
years after the takeover year of the target firm it is matched with. We are able to match 95 of our PE 
takeover targets according to the latter criterion. An additional two PE takeover targets are matched by 
relaxing this criterion as the only suitable non-target firm survives for just one year after the acquisition 
year. This results in a total of 97 firms matched by industry and size.  
                                                 
2
  We do not collect data for the year of the acquisition (i.e. year 0) since the acquisition itself tends to significantly distort the 
acquired firm’s reporting pattern with many not publishing any financial statements for that year. 
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The second sample of matched firms is obtained by matching each target firm with a non-target firm with 
identical pre-event profitability and survival up until at least the 2nd year. Our measure of pre-event 
profitability is earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by turnover in year -1 (or year -2 if data for 
year -1 are not available). Barber and Lyon (1996) argue that the usual test statistics are only well 
specified in the case of samples that perform either exceptionally well or exceptionally poorly if these 
firms are matched with firms of a similar pre-event profitability.3  We are able to match 105 of our target 
firms with a non-target firm with identical pre-event profitability. For the 105 target firms that could be 
matched the average (median) difference in performance with their matched firm is 1.42% (0.03%). This 
suggests that the matching is of reasonable quality.  The industry classification of our sample is based on 
the Fama and French 10 industry sectors (or portfolios).4  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of the 106 acquisitions in terms of the year of the acquisition. 
There is a peak in the number of IBOs between 1998 and 2000, mirroring the peak in regular takeovers 
during the same period (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). Panel B shows the availability of data 
on the target firms and the two samples of matched firms across time relative to the takeover year, i.e. 
year 0. As the targets of private equity takeovers are typically delisted from the stock exchange and 
become private companies, it is not always straightforward to identify and/ or trace the private firm. 
Nevertheless, the Companies House register and the FAME database enable us to locate data for years 1 
and 2 following the takeover year for 68 firms and for years 3 and 4 for 59 firms and 56 firms, 
respectively. Unfortunately, despite being able to locate the financial accounts for a small number of 
companies, their operation and size were so different compared to the pre-acquisition period that we 
decided to exclude these companies from the sample. 
                                                 
3
  In the pilot study, we followed the approach by Smart and Waldfogel (1994) which consists of calculating the difference in 
abnormal profits between the target firms and the control sample. These abnormal profits are defined as the difference between 
the actual change in profitability and the change in profitability as predicted by financial analysts in the year before the 
acquisition announcement. While this difference-in-surprises approach overcomes the problem of wrongfully attributing 
changes in profitability to the acquisition when in actual fact these changes would have happened anyway, this approach is very 
demanding in terms of data as it requires earnings forecasts made in the year preceding the acquisition for both the target firm 
and the control firm.  
4
 The definition of the industry sectors can be found at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_10_ind_port.html. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2.2 Methodology 
Our main research question is whether targets of takeovers by private equity investors experience 
decreases in the number of employees while adjusting for differences in employee-related expenses and 
differences in productivity. We follow Conyon et al.’s (2001 and 2002) approach. Conyon et al. use the 
same set-up as in Nickell (1984). This consists of firms that have quadratic cost functions, Cobb-Douglas 
technologies as well as output constraints and that are price takers in the markets for production factors 
(see also Bresson et al. 1996).  Firms will then minimise their costs subject to their output constraints. 
Assuming profit maximization and rational expectations, firms will then use quantities of labour and 
capital such that the marginal revenue from labour equals the wage rate and the marginal revenue from 
capital equals the user cost of capital.  One can then derive a demand for labour function which depends 
on the expected quantity of output and the ratio of the expected wage rate to the expected user cost of 
capital. Once this is re-expressed in terms of the observed variables, one obtains the following general 
adjustment model or demand for employment for firm i: 
     (1) 
where the natural logarithm of the number of employees is Lit; the natural logarithm of real wages  is wit  
(in relative terms to the cost of capital to the user) and  the natural logarithm of real output over value 
added is Qit. γi is unobserved fixed, firm-specific effects; ηt is time-specific effects; and εit is an error term. 
Real turnover (following Conyon 2001) serves as an approximation for real output, as the latter is not 
commonly reported in company accounts.5  Given the difficulties with estimating this user cost of capital 
across firms, in line with Conyon et al. (2001) and most of the literature on the demand for labour (see 
                                                 
5
 Nickell et al. (1992) discuss the validity of this proxy. 
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e.g. Hijzen and Swaim, 2010), for each firm we set the user cost of capital equal to one.6 We normalise all 
of right-hand side variables by dividing them with the average number of employees for the same year.  
We augment the above labour demand model by three dummy variables to capture the potential effect of 
IBOs on employment. The first dummy variable is Target firm. This dummy is set to one if the 
observation relates to a target firm, and zero otherwise. This dummy measures whether there is a long-run 
trend in employment in the target firms independent of the takeover. The second dummy variable is Post 
takeover. This dummy is set to one for the post takeover years for both the target firms and their matched 
firms, and zero otherwise. In other words, this dummy equals one for all firm-year observations relating 
to years 1 to 4, independent of whether they relate to target firms or control firms. This dummy measures 
a possible industry- or market-wide trend in employment during years 1 to 4. Finally, the third dummy is 
Post takeover * Target firm. This dummy is the interaction of the previous two dummies. It captures a 
possible employment effect which is limited to the target firms in the post-takeover period. If this dummy 
is negative and significant, this suggests that there is a reduction in employment in the target firms after 
their takeover which is absent in the control firms. 
The labour demand model is estimated using three different estimation techniques. These are ordinary 
least squares (OLS), fixed-effects or within-groups OLS (WG) and the generalised method of moments as 
a system (System GMM). All three estimation techniques allow for unbalanced panels, i.e. panels where 
the number of annual observations varies across firms. OLS suffers from possible omitted-variable bias. 
In addition, alpha, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, is likely to be upward biased under 
OLS as the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side will be correlated with the error term γi 
which will contain the omitted variable(s). Under WG, the time mean is differenced away from each 
variable which results in time-invariant γi being differenced away from the above equation. However, as a 
result of this transformation, the transformed ηt will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable (via 
                                                 
6
 Hijzen and Swaim (2010) suggest another reason for treating the cost of capital as a constant. Keeping the cost of capital 
constant reduces the risk of mistaking shifts in the labour demand function for changes in the slope of the demand function. 
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ηt-1) which is likely to cause alpha to be downward biased, especially – as in our case – when the number 
of periods in the panel is small. Hence, both OLS and WG suffer from a biased alpha, but the bias being 
in opposite directions. Blundell and Bond’s (1998) generalised method of moments as a system of first-
differenced equations (with the lags of the dependent variable and the independent variables as 
instrumental variables) and the equations in levels (with the first differences of the variables as 
instruments)7 addresses the omitted variable bias.8  Effectively, this makes System GMM a hybrid 
regression technique which should generate an estimated value of alpha lying somewhere between the 
OLS estimate (which tends to be upward biased) and the WG estimate (which tends to be downward 
biased).  However, before we discuss the results from the estimation of the labour demand model, we 
report the descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the model.  
3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section starts with the univariate analysis of the variables included in the labour demand model as 
well as two additional variables which are EBIT over turnover and EBIT over employees. These two 
additional variables are profitability ratios. As the above labour demand equation does not include a 
measure of profitability, but low profitability may be a reason why a firm is targeted by private equity 
                                                 
7
  Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Blundell and Bond (1998) found that the simple version of the generalised method of moments 
consisting of first-differencing the equation to be estimated and then using the lagged levels of the dependent variable as well 
as the lagged levels of the independent variables as instruments (see Arellano and Bond 1991) does not perform well in two 
situations. The first situation amounts to the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable being close to unity (this seems to be 
the case for our data as the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to one across the three estimation 
techniques). The second one consists of the variance of the fixed effects γi being large. In these situations, System GMM has 
been shown to perform better. There is a further reason why it makes sense to use System GMM in our context. Indeed, one of 
our explanatory variables is time invariant and would thus be differenced away under first-differences GMM. 
8
 The first set of regressions are regressions in first differences and the instruments are the (lagged) levels of the dependent and 
independent variables. As the instruments are in the form of lags and are not first-differenced, they include the industry 
dummies. However, the regressions themselves do not include the industry dummies. The second set of regressions are 
regressions in levels and the instruments are the first differences of the dependent and independent variables. In contrast to the 
first set of regressions, the set of instruments does not include the industry dummies whereas the regressions include these 
dummies.  
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investors, it is important to examine such measures and to compare the target firms’ profitability with that 
of the control firms.9 The remainder of the section focuses on the regression analysis.  
3.1 Univariate analysis 
All the tables on the univariate results (i.e. Tables 2, 3 and 4) are laid out in the same way. Panel A 
contains the actual descriptive statistics (the mean, the median and the number of observations) for the 
sample of the targets as well as the two samples of control firms. Panel B investigates whether there are 
any significant changes in the variable of interest over time for each of the three samples by conducting 
both t-tests for differences in means and a non-parametric Wilcoxon test for differences in medians. 
Finally, Panel C and Panel D investigate whether there are significant differences for each given year 
between the sample firms on one side and the industry-and-size matched firms and the performance 
matched firms, respectively, on the other side. As stated in the methodology section, all of the monetary 
amounts are expressed in real terms, with a base year of 2003. 
Table 2 is on employment growth. Panel A suggests that there is a decrease in employment as reflected by 
negative average (median) growth rates in the target firms in years 1, 2 and 4 (1 and 4) after the 
acquisition. A decrease in the average and median employment growth rate can also be observed for years 
3 and 4 for the industry-and-size matched firms, suggesting that there is an industry-wide reduction in 
employment, maybe as a reaction to the reduction in employment in the target firms. However, apart from 
the median growth rate in year 3, the growth rates for the performance matched firms are always positive. 
Panel B shows that the drop in employment in year 1 in the target firms is statistically significant. In 
contrast, the negative average (median) growth rates that are observed for the industry-and-size matched 
firms in years 3 and 4 and for the performance matched firms in year 3 are not statistically significant 
drops, except for the industry-and-size matched firms for year 3. When the target firms are compared to 
the industry-and-size matched firms (Panel C) and the profitability matched firms (Panel D), employment 
                                                 
9
  Later on in the regression analysis, we augment the labour demand model by EBIT over turnover, the inverse of turnover and 
the industry dummies, all three of which are used to select the control variables. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for 
this suggestion. 
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growth is significantly lower in the former in years 1 and 2. All of the t-tests for the differences in means 
and the non-parametric tests for the differences in medians are significant at the one percent level for year 
1. In addition, some of the test statistics are also significant in year 2 at the 10 percent level or better. To 
sum up, Table 2 suggests that there is a significant decline in employment in the target firms after the 
acquisition which is not observed in either sample of control firms.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for wages over employees. For virtually the entire 11-year period 
(see Panel A), average as well as median wages are lowest in the target firms as compared to the industry-
and-size matched firms and the profitability matched firms. Further, Panel B does not suggest that there 
are any significant changes over time for the target firms and the control firms. When the target firms are 
compared to the two samples of control firms (see Panels C and D) there is some evidence that wages are 
significantly lower in the former than in the latter after the takeover. Hence, while there is no evidence of 
employees of the target firms earning wages above the market rate before the takeover, there is some 
evidence that their wages fall below the market rate during the years following the takeover.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that (real) turnover over employees, our proxy for (real) output or productivity, 
tends to be lower for the sample firms for most of the period when compared to the control firms. 
Surprisingly however, Panel B does not suggest any significant trends over time such as an improvement 
in the productivity of the sample firms post-takeover. Finally, Panels C and D suggest that the lower 
productivity for the sample firms observed in Panel A is statistically significant. Interestingly, the lower 
productivity of the sample firms disappears post-takeover when these are compared to the industry-and-
size matched firms (albeit initial differences were less pronounced) whereas it remains when these are 
compared to the profitability matched firms (where differences in productivity pre-takeover were much 
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more pronounced). This suggests that private equity houses are not able to improve the relatively low 
productivity of their target firms after the takeover. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
EBIT over turnover is one of the two profitability variables covered by the univariate study, but not 
included in the labour demand model. The descriptive statistics are not reported in tabular form due to 
space constraints. The average for EBIT over turnover is highly volatile for the sample firms and the 
profitability matched firms, but somewhat less so for the industry-and-size matched firms. However, the 
median profitability ratio is much less volatile over time. Comparing the median profitability ratio across 
the sample firms and control firms suggests that the former do not perform any worse than the latter. 
Further, there is no evidence suggesting any significant trends in the profitability ratio for any of the three 
samples. Although there is some evidence for years -6 and -5 that the sample firms performed worse than 
the industry-and-size matched firms, there is no such evidence of underperformance for the remaining 
years of the period of study. Finally, there is no evidence either that the target firms perform differently 
from the profitability matched firms after the takeover.  
EBIT over employees is the other variable not included in the labour demand model. Again, the 
descriptive statistics are not reported in tabular form due to space constraints. Similar to EBIT over 
turnover, the average for the ratio of EBIT over employees is highly volatile, making it problematic to 
infer any patterns over time and across samples. However, the median profitability ratio is much less 
volatile. Further, the numbers suggest that the target firms underperform compared to the two samples of 
control firms, but that this underperformance disappears in years 3 and 4. When compared to the industry-
and-size matched sample, the profitability of the target firms is significantly lower over most of the period 
ranging from year -6 to year 1. However after year 1, there are no longer significant differences in 
profitability between the two samples. In contrast, when the target firms are compared to the profitability 
matched firms (these were matched by EBIT over turnover) the underperformance of the target firms 
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persists across the entire period of study ranging from year -6 to year 4. Hence, it would be wrong to state 
that there is strong, consistent evidence that the relative profitability of the target firms improves after the 
takeover. 
3.2 Regression analysis 
Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of the labour demand model. As stated in the methodology 
section, the model is estimated using three different estimation techniques which are OLS in levels, WG 
(fixed effects) regressions and System GMM. Regressions (1) to (7) exclude industry dummies whereas 
regressions (8) to (13) include industry dummies based on the Fama and French 10 industry sectors as 
well as the two other selection variables for the control firms. As a reminder, one of the control sample is 
obtained by matching the target firms with non-acquired firms with the same 3-digit SIC code, and with 
the closest turnover in the year of the acquisition (or the preceding year if the target firm does not report 
turnover for the acquisition year). The other control sample is obtained by matching the target firms with 
non-acquired firms with identical pre-event profitability measured by EBIT over turnover in year -1 (or 
year -2 if data for year -1 are not available). We add these three selection variables to regressions (8) to 
(13) of Table 5. We include the inverse of (the logarithm of) turnover given that the regressions also 
include turnover over employees. Including turnover rather than its inverse creates severe 
multicollinearity. Note that the WG estimation technique does not allow for industry dummies as these 
would effectively be dropped when each variable is transformed into its deviation from its time mean. In 
contrast, the OLS and System GMM techniques allow for the inclusion of industry dummies.10 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Overall, the labour demand model fits the data as all of the variables forming the basic model have the 
expected sign and are also typically highly significant. The coefficient on lagged employment is highly 
significant and close to one in regressions (1) to (7), suggesting persistence in the employment figures 
                                                 
10
 See footnote 8 as to the inclusion of industry dummies in the System GMM regressions. 
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across time.11 When the three selection variables are included (regressions (8) to (13)), the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable, while still being significantly different from zero, drops in size. This drop 
is mainly due to the size and high significance of the inverse of log of turnover. 
As expected, the value of the coefficient is highest in the OLS regressions and lowest in the WG 
regressions. While the value of the coefficient obtained from the System GMM regressions should 
typically be somewhere between the lower WG coefficient and the higher OLS coefficient, it is actually 
quite close to the latter. This suggests that for the particular case of our data set the WG regressions seem 
to be more prone to bias than the OLS regressions.12 Except for the System GMM regressions augmented 
by the selection variables (i.e. regressions (11) to (13)), the coefficient on contemporaneous wage levels is 
significant and negative as expected. The coefficient on contemporaneous output is negative and 
significant in all the regressions, except in the two WG regressions. The coefficient on lagged turnover 
over employees is significant and positive in nine out of the thirteen regressions as expected. The 
coefficient on lagged output is significant and positive as expected in the majority of the regressions. The 
various regressions include up to three of the above mentioned dummies which measure potential 
employment effects across time and across the samples of the target firms and the control firms.  
Except for the first OLS regression (regression (1)), the coefficient on the post-takeover dummy is never 
significant. The significant coefficient in the first OLS regression suggests that there is industry- or 
market-wide reduction in employment across all three samples. Moreover, the target firm dummy is not 
significant in any of the regressions, except for regression (8).13 Hence, there is no systematic evidence of 
a drop in employment in the target firms independent of the IBO. Finally and more importantly, the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the two previous dummy variables is always negative and 
                                                 
11
  As mentioned above, this suggests that System GMM is more appropriate than first-differences GMM. 
12
  A closer look at Table 5 suggests that the OLS regressions suffer from first-order serial correlation as the m1 test statistic is 
highly significant. As the WG regressions are based on the deviation of each observation from its time mean, first-order serial 
correlation is not a concern whereas second-order serial correlation is. Fortunately, the m2 test statistic is not significant for 
any of the WG regressions. Similarly, second-order correlation only is a concern for the System GMM regressions, but none 
of these regressions are subject to this type of serial correlation.  
13
  As this dummy is time invariant, it cannot be included in the WG regression. 
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highly significant (at the 1 percent level, except for regression (12) where it is significant at the 5 percent 
level). This effect is observed independent of whether the other two dummies are included and 
independent of whether industry dummies and the two selection variables (the inverse of the log of 
turnover and the log of profit over turnover) are included. More importantly, as the effect is consistently 
observed across the three estimation techniques it is very robust and not dependent on either the 
estimation technique used or the inclusion (or not) of the selection variables.  
Hence, our results suggest that there is a drop in employment in the target firms post-takeover which 
cannot be justified by differences in productivity and/ or labour costs. There is no equivalent drop in the 
control firms suggesting that the effect we observe is not an industry- or market-wide effect, but an effect 
which is limited to the target firms.  
To further test the robustness of our results, instead of pooling the available observations for all three 
samples we re-run the regressions after matching each firm-year observation for the target firms with an 
actual firm-year observation for each of the two control samples. In other words, if there is no observation 
for a given target firm for a particular year we also exclude the equivalent firm-year observation for the 
control firm, and vice-versa. The results, which are not reported in tabular form, confirm the above 
results. We also re-estimate the regressions separately for each of the three samples, including a post-
takeover period dummy, which is set to one for years falling within the post-acquisition period for the 
target firms as well as the equivalent period for the control firms (the results are not reported in a table). 
The latter is only significant and negative in the regressions based on the target firms, confirming our 
earlier results. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This study provides empirical evidence on an extremely topical issue – the impact of private equity 
takeovers on employment in the acquired firms. We overcome a key methodological weakness of prior 
research in this field by focusing exclusively on the employment consequences of institutional buy outs 
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(IBOs) as these are more likely to lend themselves to the type of negative employee consequences 
politicians and trade union representatives are most concerned about. Specifically, we examine whether 
there are changes to employee numbers, employee productivity, employee remuneration as well as 
profitability over an 11-year window around the year of the takeover. In total we investigate 106 IBOs 
undertaken in the UK between 1997 and 2006, compared with two control samples of firms that remain 
independent, matched in terms of size as well as industry and in terms of prior profitability, respectively. 
Although the study is based on a single liberal market economy, the UK, it can be argued that the findings 
have a broader relevance in shedding light on the potential impact of private equity in lightly regulated, 
mature markets. Replication of this study in other such contexts would make for a more detailed picture, 
albeit one that could not readily be accommodated within a single article. 
Our core finding is that of a significant loss in employment in firms subject to an IBO immediately 
following the takeover, when compared to both of our control groups, with a coterminous tendency for 
wages to fall below the market rate. Furthermore, we find no evidence of improved productivity or 
profitability subsequent to the takeover. Whilst employees may acquiesce in wage cuts in return for the 
preservation of jobs, such takeovers are also more likely to result in job losses. Yet, despite (or because 
of) pay cuts and job losses, productivity in the sample firms remained significantly lower than in the 
control firms. This suggests that any supposed disciplinary benefits from job cuts (either in terms of 
ejecting the lowest strata of performers and/ or incentivizing surviving staff) have not resulted in material 
gains. Indeed, the productivity and profitability of the sample firms remain lower than for the control 
firms during the four-year period following the takeover, suggesting that a climate of insecurity in tenure 
and reward reduces employee productivity and firm profitability (c.f. Schweiger and Denisi 1991: 110). 
As Bucholtz and Ribbens (1994: 556) note, employees have investments in firm specific human capital. 
Hence, they may react negatively to a new managerial style that increases employment risk to such an 
extent that it outweighs any disciplinary benefits of insecurity. In short, the findings presented here 
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suggest that IBOs and their impact on managerial practices do not appear to be an effective mechanism 
for turning round failing firms. 
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APPENDIX A – Sample Selection Criteria:  
1. Targets must be listed on the London Stock Exchange (i.e. the Official List, the techMARK, the 
AIM or the USM). 
2. The acquisition must have been completed between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2006. 
3. Thomson One Banker lists a total of 49 acquisitions under acquisition technique “institutional 
buyout” (IBO), of which two acquisitions relating to venture capital trusts (VCTs) were excluded. 
4. Thomson One Banker lists a total of 67 acquisitions under acquisition technique “financial 
acquiror” (excluding MBOs and MBIs), of which 14 were excluded for the following reasons: 
a. 1 acquisition was made by a family; 
b. 1 acquisition by a sovereign wealth fund; 
c. 6 MBOs/MBIs; 
d. 1 acquisition without detailed acquisition data in Thomson One Banker; 
e. 1 acquisition consisting of the founder shareholder taking the firm private; 
f. 1 acquisition by 3i plc which is a listed investment trust; 
g. 2 acquisitions of investment trusts; and 
h. 1 acquisition which does not involve 100% of the target’s equity. 
5. We add six acquisitions made by a “strategic investor”. Thomson One Banker no longer makes 
this distinction and most of these transactions are now listed under acquisition technique 
“financial acquiror”.  
N.B. As Thomson One Banker’s distinction between an institutional investor (buyout)14 and a financial 
investor15 is neither consistent nor in line with the academic literature, we decided to merge both types. 
To illustrate the inconsistencies relating to this distinction, Blackstone is listed as a financial investor for 
                                                 
14
  “A highly leveraged transaction where one or more institutional investors act together to lead or initiate a buyout deal”. 
15
  “A financial company (buyout firm, venture capital company, merchant bank, commercial bank, etc.) and the target’s main 
industry is non-financial and it must be acquired for financial rather than strategic reasons.” 
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the case of the 1998 acquisition of Savoy Hotel plc, but is listed as an institutional buy out investor for the 
case of the 2006 acquisition of Center Parcs (UK) Group plc.  
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Table 1: Annual Breakdown of Private Equity Acquisitions and Industry-and-size 
Matched Companies and Performance-Matched Companies 
 
There are 106 sample companies. Each sample firm is matched with a control firm with the same 
3-digit SIC code, which survives for at least year 2 and with the closest possible turnover in the 
year of the acquisition or the preceding year to form the first control sample. An alternative 
control sample is formed by matching each sample firm with a control firm which survives for at 
least year 2 and with the closest pre-event performance (EBIT/ turnover). Panel A reports the 
annual breakdown of the sample firms in terms of the year of the completion of the acquisition as 
well as that of the two samples of control firms. Panel B reports the availability of data for the 
sample firms and the two control samples. Year 0 is the year when the acquisition was 
completed. 
 
Panel A: Annual breakdown of private equity acquisitions and industry-and-size matched companies and 
performance-matched companies 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
No of 
com-
panies 
Sample 
companies 
2 15 16 9 2 4 11 7 14 26 
Industry-and-size 
matched 
companies 
2 13 14 9 2 4 11 7 12 23 
Performance 
matched 
companies 
2 15 16 9 2 4 10 7 14 26 
Panel B: Availability of data for private equity acquisitions and industry-and-size matched companies and 
performance-matched companies for six years before and four years after the acquisition 
Year  -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
No of 
com-
panies 
Sample 
companie
s 
79 86 93 98 105 103  68 68 59 56 
Industry-
and-size 
matched 
com-
panies 
73 80 86 89 91 90  89 88 85 80 
Performa
nce 
matched 
com-
panies 
85 89 96 96 102 103  102 100 90 89 
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Table 2: Employment Growth 
Employment growth is measured by the growth rate in the number of employees, i.e. the percentage growth rate in 
the average annual number of employees. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample companies, the 
industry-and-size matched companies and the performance matched companies. Panel B reports tests for the 
differences in means (medians) between each year and the subsequent year for the sample companies, the industry-
and-size matched companies and the performance matched companies, respectively. Panels C and D contain for 
each year the tests for the differences in means (medians) between the sample companies and the industry-and-size 
matched companies and the differences in means (medians) between the sample companies and the performance 
matched companies, respectively. The numbers in italic in Panels C and D are the tests for the differences in means 
(medians) based on paired observations. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level of statistical 
significance. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  
Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Sample 
companies 
Mean  36.71 15.40 11.59 12.58 9.77 -1.69 -0.94 0.44 -3.74 
Median  10.81 6.11 3.05 2.97 4.04 -4.80 0.25 0.59 -1.16 
Industry-and-
size matched 
companies 
Mean  9.92 10.95 16.93 28.17 31.31 19.29 4.86 -0.68 -3.92 
Median  5.17 4.32 4.12 0.00 2.17 2.45 0.63 -1.44 -1.95 
Performance 
matched 
companies 
Mean  17.30 12.90 12.83 572.96 7.07 28.56 4.30 1.88 1.71 
Median  2.77 3.35 4.84 3.03 4.69 8.93 2.19 -1.16 0.73 
Observations 
Sample 
Companies 
 
79 86 93 98 102 67 64 58 56 
Industry-and-
size matched 
companies 
 
72 80 86 89 89 88 87 85 79 
Performance 
matched 
companies 
 
85 89 92 96 102 102 100 90 87 
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Table 2 Cont’d 
 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
  
Difference 
between 
year -5 
and year -
4 
Difference 
between 
year -4 
and year -
3 
Difference 
between 
year -3 and 
year -2 
Difference 
between 
year -2 
and year -
1 
Difference 
between 
year -1 
and year 1 
Difference 
between 
year 1 and 
year 2 
Difference 
between 
year 2 and 
year 3 
Difference 
between 
year 3 and 
year 4 
Sample 
companies 
t-test for differences in 
means 
1.753* 0.650 -0.172 0.589 2.071** -0.128 -0.447 1.431 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
1.385 1.140 -0.348 0.075 2.860*** -1.326 0.026 0.856 
Industry-
and-size 
matched 
companies 
t-test for differences in 
means 
-0.255 -0.613 -0.649 -0.146 0.723 2.410** 1. 920* 1.062 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
0.410 0.074 0.894 -0.516 -0.019 0.779 2.170** 0.543 
Performance 
matched 
companies 
t-test for differences in 
means 
0.536 0.011 -0.971 1.033 -2.600*** 2.936*** 0.811 0.045 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians 
-0.288 -0.620 0.639 -0.045 -1.758** 2.474*** 0.692 0.158 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and industry-and-size matched 
companies 
 
Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
2.108** 
2.301** 
0.867 
1.355 
-0.553 
-0.510 
-1.071 
-1.117 
-1.446 
-1.545 
-2.696*** 
-3.084*** 
-1.722* 
-1.416* 
0.427 
0.752 
0.051 
0.904 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
1.501 
2.551** 
0.656 
0.956 
-0.450 
-0.400 
0.668 
0.197 
0.104 
-0.967 
-2.760*** 
-2.949*** 
-1.101 
-2.040** 
1.061 
1.054 
0.518 
1.250 
Panel D: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and performance matched companies 
 
Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
1.407 
1.225 
0.450 
0.665 
-0.178 
-0.463 
-1.003 
-0.998 
0.743 
0.339 
-2.824*** 
-2.940*** 
-1.719* 
-1.233 
-0.440 
-1.206 
-1.335 
-0.440 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
2.559** 
2.160** 
1.121 
1.139 
-0.601 
-0.616 
0.068 
-0.304 
0.056 
-0.090 
-3.720*** 
-2.774*** 
-1.246 
-0.772 
-0.436 
-1.355 
-1.195 
-1.022 
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Table 3: Wages over Employees 
 
Wages is total wages and salaries in £000s. Employees is the annual average number of employees. Panel A 
reports descriptive statistics for the sample companies, the industry-and-size matched companies and the 
performance matched companies. Panel B reports tests for the differences in means (medians) between each year 
and the subsequent year for the sample companies, the industry-and-size matched companies and the performance 
matched companies, respectively. Panels C and D contain for each year the tests for the differences in means 
(medians) between the sample companies and the industry-and-size matched companies and the differences in 
means (medians) between the sample companies and the performance matched companies, respectively. The 
numbers in italic in Panels C and D are the tests for the differences in means (medians) based on paired 
observations. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level of statistical significance. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Sample 
companies 
Mean 20.35 21.90 24.60 25.78 27.61 29.46 28.52 30.87 31.00 34.01 
Median 15.63 16.46 18.98 20.03 20.40 21.55 22.61 25.87 24.81 28.07 
Industry-
and-size 
matched 
companies 
Mean 23.28 24.77 26.54 29.95 30.80 30.17 38.43 41.11 44.17 44.21 
Median 17.50 17.70 19.11 20.13 21.75 22.43 25.88 27.73 29.55 33.31 
Performance 
matched 
companies 
Mean 21.05 22.38 22.99 26.27 28.51 30.89 33.81 37.15 39.23 42.86 
Median 18.15 18.33 18.97 20.11 21.75 23.17 25.93 26.83 29.75 31.04 
Observations 
Sample companies 79 86 93 98 105 103 68 68 59 56 
Industry-and-size 
matched companies 
72 80 86 89 91 89 89 88 85 81 
Performance 
matched companies 
85 89 96 96 102 103 102 100 89 89 
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Table 3 Cont’d 
 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
 
 
 
 
Difference 
between 
year -6 
and year -
5 
Difference 
between 
year -5 
and year -
4 
Differenc
e 
between 
year -4 
and year 
-3 
Difference 
between 
year -3 
and year -
2 
Difference 
between year 
-2 and year -
1 
Difference 
between 
year -1 and 
year 1 
Difference 
between 
year 1 and 
year 2 
Difference 
between 
year 2 and 
year 3 
Difference 
between 
year 3 and 
year 4 
Sample 
companies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
-0.646 -1.002 -0.435 -0.641 -0.552 0.253 -0.728 -0.040 -0.879 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.548 -1.227 -0.699 -0.543 -0.483 -0.319 -1.319 -0.242 -0.979 
Industry-
and-size 
matched 
companies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
-0.421 -0.444 -0.669 -0.155 0.141 -1.242 -0.325 -0.371 -0.005 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.478 -0.441 -0.819 -0.658 -0.432 -1.394 -1.014 -0.627 -0.880 
Per-
formance 
matched 
companies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
-0.653 -0.282 -1.206 -0.666 -0.641 -0.745 -0.760 -0.436 -0.663 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.492 -0.374 -0.829 -1.079 -0.798 -1.248 -0.908 -1.004 -0.714 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and industry-and-size matched 
companies 
  
Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
-1.017 
-0.679 
-0.943 
-0.804 
-0.542 
-0.377 
-0.959 
-0.818 
-0.771 
-0.622 
-0.199 
-0.045 
-1.343 
-0.499 
-1.567 
-1.330 
-1.717* 
-1.256 
-1.991** 
-1.495 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
-0.998 
-0.559 
-0.188 
-0.635 
-0.446 
-0.021 
-0.393 
-0.673 
-0.577 
-0.301 
-0.525 
-0.512 
-1.431 
-0.383 
-1.244 
-0.905 
-1.497 
-0.360 
-1.528 
-0.806 
Panel D: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and performance matched companies 
  
Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
-0.344 
-0.165 
-0.207 
0.084 
0.638 
0.187 
-0.168 
-0.620 
-0.277 
-0.850 
-0.376 
-0.760 
-1.345 
-1.390 
-1.392 
-1.720* 
-1.831* 
-2.462** 
-1.513 
-2.064** 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
-1.130 
-0.467 
-1.042 
-0.315 
0.021 
0.068 
-0.056 
-0.154 
-0.531 
-1.072 
-0.845 
-1.062 
-1.422 
-1.383 
-0.921 
-1.725* 
-1.651* 
-2.544** 
-1.186 
-2.265** 
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Table 4: Turnover over Employees 
 
Turnover is company turnover in £000s. Employees is the annual average number of employees. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the sample companies, the industry-and-size matched companies and the performance 
matched companies. Panel B reports tests for the differences in means (medians) between each year and the 
following year for the sample companies, the industry-and-size matched companies and the performance 
matched companies, respectively. Panels C and D contain for each year the tests for the differences in means 
(medians) between the sample companies and the industry-and-size matched companies and the differences in 
means (medians) between the sample companies and the performance matched companies, respectively. The 
numbers in italic in Panels C and D are the tests for the differences in means (medians) based on paired 
observations. The asterisks indicate a 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level of statistical significance. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Sample 
companies 
Mean 94.47 104.54 120.75 120.17 126.06 130.82 134.64 153.64 155.73 173.18 
Median 59.58 59.32 65.82 71.43 75.82 78.39 91.84 101.58 100.03 103.26 
Industry-
and-size 
matched 
companies 
Mean 243.40 226.75 230.42 248.49 281.55 241.41 231.34 275.56 267.93 276.95 
Median 72.07 78.99 84.21 82.32 91.59 99.91 106.67 122.51 119.35 130.15 
Perfor-
mance 
matched 
companies 
Mean 123.89 119.80 115.45 117.52 146.10 161.22 181.82 219.27 238.66 252.14 
Median 85.36 91.52 89.50 89.66 93.20 101.77 110.96 112.16 136.74 143.25 
Obser-
vations 
Sample Companies 79 85 92 98 105 103 67 68 59 56 
Industry-and-size 
matched companies 
72 80 86 89 91 89 89 88 85 81 
Performance 
matched companies 
85 89 96 96 102 103 102 100 90 89 
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Table 4 Cont’d 
 
Panel B: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between years for a given sample 
 
 
 
 
Difference 
between 
year -6 
and year -
5 
Difference 
between 
year -5 
and year -
4 
Differenc
e 
between 
year -4 
and year 
-3 
Difference 
between 
year -3 
and year -
2 
Difference 
between year 
-2 and year -
1 
Difference 
between 
year -1 and 
year 1 
Difference 
between 
year 1 and 
year 2 
Difference 
between 
year 2 and 
year 3 
Difference 
between 
year 3 and 
year 4 
Sample 
com-
panies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
-0.503 -0.624 0.021 -0.226 -0.173 -0.135 -0.740 -0.074 -0.565 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.499 -0.693 -0.599 -0.772 -0.596 -0.719 -1.206 -0.174 -0.353 
Industry
-and-
size 
matched 
com-
panies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
0.138 -0.038 -0.173 -0.275 0.351 0.115 -0.486 0.074 -0.098 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.566 -0.412 -0.424 -0.821 -0.275 -0.669 -1.011 -0.220 -0.657 
Perform
ance 
matched 
com-
panies 
t-test for 
differences 
in means 
0.229 0.340 -0.172 -1.640 -0.604 -0.623 -0.871 -0.399 -0.277 
Wilcoxon 
test for 
differences 
in medians 
-0.802 -0.033 -0.086 -1.122 -0.459 -0.718 -0.850 -1.181 -0.704 
Panel C: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and industry-and-size matched 
companies 
  
Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
-1.504 
-1.413 
-1.866* 
-1.759* 
-1.530 
-1.332 
-1.738* 
1.414 
-1.772* 
-1.560 
-1.726* 
-1.555 
-1.431 
-0.379 
-1.478 
-1.117 
-1.233 
-0.867 
-1.603 
-0.964 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
-1.289 
-1.547 
-1.441 
-1.993* 
-1.252 
-1.683* 
-1.201 
-1.133 
-1.519 
-1.971** 
-1.382 
-1.858* 
-1.176 
-0.293 
-1.033 
-0.726 
-1.046 
-0.476 
-1.184 
-0.606 
Panel D: Test statistics for differences in means and differences in medians between sample companies and performance matched 
companies 
  
Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
 
t-test for 
differences in 
means 
-1.463 
-1.562 
-0.860 
-1.554 
0.240 
-1.426 
0.132 
-1.662 
-0.836 
-2.240** 
-1.068 
-2.080** 
-1.349 
-1.453 
-1.471 
-1.956* 
-1.825* 
-2.108** 
-1.667* 
-2.104** 
Wilcoxon test for 
differences in 
medians 
-2.555** 
-1.872* 
-2.795*** 
-2.361** 
-2.373** 
-2.465** 
-1.783* 
-3.012*** 
-2.337** 
-
3.267*** 
-2.301** 
-3.308*** 
-1.761* 
-2.277** 
-1.409 
-2.494** 
-2.143** 
-3.139*** 
-2.209** 
-
3.164*** 
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Table 5: Labour demand model 
This table reports the results from estimating the labour demand model on all the available observations (sample companies, size-and-industry matched companies and performance matched 
companies). Log(Employeest) is the natural logarithm of the average annual number of employees for year t. Log(Wages over Employeest) is the natural logarithm of wages (total wages and salaries in 
£000s) over the annual average number of employees for year t. Log(Turnover over Employeest) is the natural logarithm of company turnover in £000s over the annual average number of employees 
for year t. All monetary amounts are expressed in real terms, with a base year of 2003. Post takeover dummy is set to one if year t is a post-acquisition year, and zero otherwise. For the control 
companies, Post takeover dummy is also set to one for the calendar years following the acquisition of the equivalent sample firm. Target firm dummy is set to one if the firm is a target firm, and zero 
otherwise. Post takeover * target firm dummy is the interaction of the Post takeover dummy and the Target firm dummy. This interaction is one for the post-acquisition years of the target companies, 
and zero otherwise. The values in parentheses are the p-values. m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) with k degrees of freedom under the null of valid instruments. 
While the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, it is not weakened by many instruments. Hence, the Hansen test which is robust, but weakened by many instruments, is 
also reported. All System GMM regressions use instruments in levels dated -3 to -5 for the equations in first differences and first-differenced instruments dated -2 for the equations in levels. The 
industry dummies in regressions (8) to (13) are based on the Fama and French 10 industry sectors.  
 OLS OLS OLS WG System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
OLS OLS OLS System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
log(Employees
 t-1) 0.962 0.961 0.962 0.773 0.984 0.997 0.973 0.554 0.556 0.556 0.151 0.159 0.165 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
log(Wages over Employeest) -0.449 -0.452 -0.452 -0.377 -0.400 -0.621 -0.466 -0.208 -0.211 -0.212 0.071 0.064 0.067 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.073) (0.040) (0.002) (0.016) (0.081) (0.077) (0.077) (0.730) (0.754) (0.749) 
log(Wages over Employeest-1) 0.381 0.383 0.382 0.277 0.306 0.455 0.311 0.172 0.172 0.174 -0.022 -0.027 -0.013 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.121) (0.048) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.122) (0.855) (0.835) (0.917) 
log(Turnover over Employeest) -0.319 -0.318 -0.318 -0.381 -0.238 -0.162 -0.178 -0.698 -0.695 -0.695 -0.786 -0.760 -0.749 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.174) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
log(Turnover over Employeest-1) 0.326 0.325 0.326 0.222 0.207 0.146 0.179 0.276 0.277 0.276 0.053 0.048 0.042 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.059) (0.181) (0.090) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.555) (0.596) (0.639) 
1/log(Turnovert) − − − − − − − -56.517 -56.295 -56.298 -100.514 -97.850 -97.505 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Profit over Turnovert) − − − − − − − 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.032 0.024 0.027 
       (0.202) (0.252) (0.201) (0.342) (0.487) (0.444) 
Post takeover dummyt -0.043 − -0.010 0.025 -0.069 − -0.036 -0.005 − 0.020 0.035 − 0.057 
(0.051)  (0.666) (0.449) (0.444)  (0.685) (0.742)  (0.249) (0.407)  (0.202) 
Target firm dummy -0.018 − 0.026 − -0.136 − 0.056 -0.038 − -0.005 -0.019 − 0.021 
(0.311)  (0.205)  (0.159)  (0.178) (0.027)  (0.804) (0.916)  (0.907) 
Post takeovert * Target firm dummyt − -0.099 -0.118 -0.146 − -0.126 -0.151 − -0.089 -0.092 − -0.071 -0.082 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.007) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.034) (0.010) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.973 − − − − 0.986 0.986 0.986 − − − 
F-test  
(p-value) 
2220.85 2285.16 2130.36 134.27 − − − 920.50 940.68 927.90 − − − 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
 33 
 OLS OLS OLS WG System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
OLS OLS OLS System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
m1  
(p-value) 
5.99 6.05 6.05 0.236 -2.77 -2.62 -2.95 8.07 8.04 8.02 -0.05 -0.43 -0.24 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.957) (0.666) (0.813) 
m2  
(p-value) 
4.15 4.09 4.07 0.095 0.07 0.12 0.17 7.17 7.15 7.08 -0.36 -0.36 -0.51 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.942) (0.901) (0.866) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.716) (0.719) (0.610) 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
− − − − 152.50 47.18 133.91 − − − 349.21 339.04 331.61 
    (0.000) (0.733) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
− − − − 85.88 48.92 71.75 − − − 108.90 108.00 106.64 
    (0.016) (0.670) (0.142)    (0.642) (0.689) (0.675) 
No. of observations 2295 2295 2295 2295 2295 2295 2295 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 1873 
 
